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Freedom of religion in South Africa: Then and now 1652 – 2008 
This article is about freedom of religion in South Africa before and 
after 1994. It is often argued that the relationship between church 
and state, and the resultant freedom of religion, during 1652-1994 
was determined by a theocratic model of the relationship between 
church and state. In a theocratic model it is religion and its 
teachings that determine the place and role of religion in society. 
This article argues that it was, in fact, a Constantinian model of the 
relationship between state and church which determined the place 
and role of religion in society between 1652 and 1994. In a 
Constantinian model it is the governing authority's understanding 
and application of religion that determines the place and role of 
religion in society as well as the resulting degree of freedom of 
religion. Examples from history are used to prove the point. The 
second part of the article discusses freedom of religion in South 
Africa after 1994.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with freedom of religion in South Africa before 
and after 1994. 
 Before 1994, freedom of religion was not a constitutionally 
guaranteed right in South Africa. After 1994 (1996), freedom of 
religion has been guaranteed by section 15 of the Constitution. It 
cannot be said that there was no freedom of religion in South Africa 
before 1994, but to understand what that freedom of religion meant, 
one must understand what the relationship between the church and 
the state was before 1994. So the question that the first part of the 
article will try to answer is: what did freedom of religion in South 
Africa mean before 1994. The second part of the article will consider 
freedom of religion in South Africa after 1994. Because the answer 
to the question is closely connected to the relationship between 
church and state, this relationship before and after 1994 will receive 
due attention. 
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 2 PART 1: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BEFORE 1994 
2.1 Challenging the state-church theory 
Many scholars have tried to define the relationship between church 
and state in South Africa between 1652 and 1994. Gerald Pillay 
(1995) divides the period in two parts. During the first 150 years, he 
says “that despite the presence of other Christian denominations and, 
indeed, other religions, there existed a state church”. Round about 
1800 a period started in which religious pluralism was allowed to 
develop. The apartheid period was a disruption of this process 
towards pluralism. The DRC again gained influence in “Caesar’s 
household”. By 1980 the African independent churches had 
overtaken all the established churches in size and growth rate (Pillay 
1995:86). As will be seen, I think Pillay’s description of the DRC as 
a state church between 1652 and 1800 can be challenged. To speak 
of the “influence in Caesar's household” after 1948 is true in a sense 
but must surely not be understood in the sense of a theocracy.  
 According to Andries Raath, the Reformational roots of the 
relationship between church and state in the early settlement at the 
Cape reflect more of the federal paradigm of the Zurich reformer 
Heinrich Bullinger than the influence of John Calvin. The federal 
paradigm means that society is not seen in terms of church and state; 
it is rather seen in terms of the people of God who are bound 
together in terms of the covenant into a Christian society (Raath 
2000:30). Although this is not explicitly stated, it would seem that it 
would imply a theocratic view of society. 
 Tracy Kuperus views the relationship between church and state 
in South Africa primarily in terms of race relations. She is of the 
opinion that the Dutch Reformed Church’s (DRC or NGK) 
entanglement with race issues “began soon after the first white 
settlers arrived in South Africa” (Kuperus 1996:2). She argues that 
“the NGK’s heavy political involvement with the state began in the 
early 1900s when it advanced a Neo-Calvinist, ideological 
justification of apartheid” (Kuperus 1996:3). Between 1948 and 
1978 the state and the DRC were virtually identical, according to 
her. “After 1961 the two entities became socially indistinguishable 
with the NGK following the state’s lead” (Kuperus 1996:3). From 
1979 until 1994, the DRC and the state agreed on key issues like 
sanctions and violence. 
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 The overlap in membership and white interests allowed 
both institutions to support one another. But by the 1980s 
the NGK had lost its influence as a dominant political 
player. The state fostered reform while the NGK could 
not offer full support, whether the issue was 
constitutional restructuring or educational reform 
(Kuperus 1996:15). 
She argues that the reason why the DRC fell behind was because it 
“deferred to its conservative faction” (Kuperus 1996:19). 
 It is offered as a hypothesis − which will need further research 
− that theocracy and Constantinianism, especially the latter, must be 
seriously taken into account if we want to understand the history of 
the relationship between church and state in South Africa. 
 In an attempt to determine the degree of religious freedom in a 
country and the concurring relationship between church and state, 
various types of the relationship between church and state can be 
identified1. For the purposes of this article the two concepts of 
                                        
1 The North American scholar Cole Durham (1996:19-23) distinguishes no 
fewer than eight possible types of relationships between church and state, with 
some in-between possibilities too. The degree of freedom of religion is in 
concurrence with the type of relationship between church and state. In 
classifying the relationship between church and state he starts with (i) absolute 
theocracies where there is an absence of freedom of religion because the state 
recognises only one religion. He then moves on to (ii) the established 
church/religion type of relationship between church and state, where it can 
happen that one church/religion is granted the monopoly within the state 
although there can be degrees of toleration. From established churches the next 
type is (iii) endorsed churches/religions in which one specific church is usually 
endorsed by the state; (iv) then there are types of relationships where there is 
(v) cooperation between the state and all churches/religions in a variety of ways 
which also includes financial support. (vi) The next possibility is one where the 
state accommodates churches/religion − the state maintains a benevolent 
neutrality towards religion but does not necessarily support it by way of 
financial subsidies. Durham describes the last two relationships as types where 
there is absolute freedom of religion. (vii) There can also be a relationship of 
separation between church and state − but this is a rigid separation where any 
display and support of religion is deemed as inappropriate and religion is very 
much restricted. (viii) An eigth type of relationship is what can be called one of 
inadvertent insensitivity, which entails a recurrent pattern of legislative or 
bureaucratic insensitivity to distinctive religious needs. (ix) A last possible type 
of relationship that Durham distinguishes is one of hostility and overt 
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 theocracy and Constantinianism are important. In the history of the 
relationship between church and state, two important trends can be 
distinguished, a distinction which proves to be very valuable. On the 
one hand there is the Constantinian model − it can also be called an 
Erastian model because of the thoughts of Thomas Erastus in this 
regard. Many well-known figures in the history of Christianity, like 
Constantine, Eusebius, Augustine, Luther and Calvin, were partly or 
completely sympathetic towards this model. On the other hand there 
is the theocratic model, which was advocated to a greater or lesser 
extent by the medieval church, Thomas Aquinas, many later Roman 
Catholic thinkers, as well as some historical Protestant streams 
(Hiemstra 2005:29). Constantinian and theocratic models for the 
relationship between church and state are not unique to Christianity. 
These models can also be found with regard to other religions and 
the way which they see their relation to the state and to the rest of 
society. 
 Both the Constantinian and theocratic models are positive 
about the role that religion should play in society − according to 
Christian thinkers, society should serve the Triune God and 
Christianity should provide direction to society. The models differ on 
who should be the guide or the leader in the role that religion plays 
in society. According to the Constantinian model the political 
authorities, often with their own understanding of what Christianity 
means, are dominant over church authorities. This means that the 
political authorities assist, influence and sometimes fully control and 
use the church. It also means that the state has a role to play in the 
advancement and support of the “true religion” even to the extent of 
using its coercive power. It is important to understand that this 
means Christianity or whatever religion, as it is understood by the 
political authorities or the state. According to the theocratic model, 
control over the role of religion in society resides with the church 
authorities and how they understand Christianity or the religion 
concerned − the church (or religion) should dominate the political 
authorities as well as the rest of society (Hiemstra 2005:28-29). 
                                                                                                               
persecution towards religion. In this type of relationship, as in theocracy, there 
is an absence of religious freedom. See also J D van der Vyver (2002:7–8) and 
Hiemstra (2005:35). 
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 2.2 Questioning the theocratic model 
It has often been said that in the history of South Africa the 
relationship between church and state, and therefore the place of 
religion in society, was determined by a theocratic model. It was also 
argued that this theocratic model was basically derived from John 
Calvin. From his theology it found its way into article 36 of the 
Belgic Confession of Faith (Fourie 2006:160-161; Coetzee 
2006:148ff)2 and thus eventually became part of the scene in South 
Africa. In other words, religion was the dominant partner in the 
relationship. This article argues that it was not a theocratic model of 
the relationship between church and state that determined the place 
of religion in the South African society from 1652 to 1994, but rather 
a Constantinian model where the state, in various degrees, 
determined the position of church and religion in society without 
denying freedom of religion or, perhaps better said, without denying 
freedom of conscience, which cannot be equated with freedom of 
religion in the true sense of the word (see Berkhof 1975:200). This 
had already started in the Netherlands and was continued at the Cape 
after 1652 and later in the rest of South Africa until 1994.  
 In the Netherlands the Reformed Churches confessed the 
Dutch/Belgic Confession of Faith3. This Confession also became 
part of the Dutch Reformed Church that came to South Africa in 
1652, as was also the case in the Dutch Reformed Churches in the 
other colonies of the Dutch Republic. Article 36 of the Dutch 
Confession states that  
… the government’s task is not limited to caring for and 
watching over the public domain but extends also to 
upholding the sacred ministry, to remove and destroy all 
idolatry and false worship of the Antichrist; to promote 
the kingdom of Jesus Christ and to see that the Word of 
God is preached everywhere so that God might be 
                                        
2 It is arguable whether the thoughts of Calvin on the relationship between 
church and state can indeed be characterised as theocratic and whether they are 
not much rather, as stated by Hiemstra and confirmed by events in history, as 
will be shown, of a Constantinian nature. 
3 At the Synod of Emden, held in German East Friesland from 4–13 
October 1571, the confessing character of the Reformed Church was 
underscored. The participants signed the Dutch Confession of Faith “to prove 
the unity in doctrine among the churches of the Netherlands”. 
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 honoured and served by everyone, as He commands in 
His Word. 
For the churches the intention of this article was to ensure that it was 
the government’s task to enable churches to do their work. However 
it soon became clear in the Netherlands that the government saw it 
as their responsibility not only to enable the church but also to 
control ecclesiastical matters. In those early years after 1571 the 
government wanted churches to avoid constraint of conscience, they 
wanted to retain the authority to appoint Reformed ministers, they 
wanted a regulation by which elders would be chosen from among 
and by the city administration, and they even wanted a decisive vote 
in matters of doctrinal difference (Blei 2006:23-24). At the 1578 
National Synod of Dordrecht the church underscored its 
independence in the appointment of ministers and the election of 
elders and deacons. However, the government would not agree to 
this, fearful that the church would interfere in matters of state (Blei 
2006:24). In 1586 at the National Synod of The Hague, church and 
state came to an agreement. In a revised church order the desires of 
government were more or less met. The church retained the right to 
elect elders and deacons but the city administration could appoint 
one or two of its members as additional members on the church 
council. In the synod meetings the authorities were represented by 
political commissioners who had to assure that the meetings would 
never make decisions on governmental matters. They often 
intervened forcefully. In the appointment of ministers the 
government maintained its influence and often supported ministers 
with divergent opinions. As a public church (i.e. an officially 
recognised church for the whole nation), the Reformed church found 
that absolute freedom from state interference (Constantinianism) was 
and remained an unattainable ideal, and that it could not emphasise 
its own identity in an unlimited way (Blei 2006:25). 
2.3 A Constantinian model 
In South Africa between 1652 and 1994 the situation was no 
different. A few examples from history support this argument. 
 From 1652–1665, responsibility for religion and the spiritual 
care for the people at the Cape resided with the Political Council 
under the leadership of the commander (Vorster 1956:38). From 
1665, when the Cape got its first permanent minister and church 
council, spiritual care and ecclesiastical matters were their 
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 responsibility. However, all decisions that the church council took 
had to be submitted to the Political Council before they could be 
implemented. The Political Council elected elders and deacons from 
a pair of names that the church council submitted to them. Political 
Commissioners represented the Political Council at all the meetings 
of the different church councils. In the documents (Vorster 1956:39) 
there is ample evidence of the authority that the Political Council 
had in church matters: they appointed sick comforters and readers, 
placed ministers and church wardens, decided on the baptism of 
heathen children, the time and place of worship services, the care for 
widows and orphans, the founding of congregations and the building 
of churches. In 1689 the Political Council refused the request of the 
French refugees to install their own Church Council in Drakenstein 
(Resolutie van Politieke Raad 28 Nov 1689). 
 About the situation in the eighteenth century McCall Theal, as 
quoted by Vorster, writes: “The Church was in one sense merely an 
engine of the State, and was always and in every sense subordinate 
to the Council of Polity” (Vorster 1956:39). Apart from the matters 
mentioned above, many more examples of the Council of Polity 
controlling ecclesiastical matters can be added (Vorster 1956:39-43). 
In 1759 they even refused the churches at the Cape permission to 
continue meeting in a local major assembly, thus putting back the 
ecclesiastical development of the church in South Africa for many 
years. 
 All of the above attests to the fact that between the years 1652-
1795 the Council of Polity had a typically Constantinian approach 
towards the church in South Africa: one of not merely protecting the 
church but also controlling it, just as it was the case in the 
Netherlands. 
 In 1795 the British took over the Cape for the first time; the 
occupation lasted until 1803. In the official Act of Surrender it was 
stated that the colonists would retain their existing privileges, 
including those pertaining to religious matters. Very soon it appeared 
that the authorities would lay claim to their patronage rights, such as 
that the political commissioner maintained his position in church 
meetings; the custom pertaining to the election of elders and deacons 
continued; and the authorities saw it as their legal right to remove a 
minister from a congregation without consulting the church council. 
Church councils had to take an oath of allegiance to the British 
monarch and in 1802 British troops were quartered in a church 
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 building in Graaff-Reinet during military actions in the region (Van 
der Watt 1976:69). 
 During the time of the Batavian rule at the Cape, 1804–1806, 
the ideas of equality and tolerance were very prominent. 
Commissioner De Mist wanted a separation of church and state, 
which meant that there was no longer a privileged church. However, 
in practice, the government still controlled the church. The 
government appointed ministers in congregations, moved them to 
other congregations and paid their salaries, while the election of 
elders and deacons was also subject to the approval of the 
authorities. In new congregations the magistrate appointed the new 
church council, and the government determined the salary of 
ministers as well as baptismal, membership, marriage and burial 
fees. The financial statements of a congregation had to be approved 
by the magistrate. In some cases even the time of church services 
was determined by government. While there was no longer an 
established or public church in South Africa, churches in fact 
became not much more than a department of government (Van der 
Watt 1976:70). 
 In 1806 the British once again occupied the Cape. Once again 
there was a guarantee that that no exceptional changes would be 
made to church-state relations. The Church Ordinance of De Mist 
was to be maintained, and the government was determined to apply 
the Ordinance. The church was controlled in more than one way. The 
Political commissioner continued to have a seat in the church 
council of Cape Town congregation, and in 1814 the practice was 
expanded to include all the congregations; also, the names of chosen 
elders and deacons still had to be submitted to the government for 
approval. At one stage the governor required that he would make the 
choice of deacons from two names that had to be submitted to him; 
the official functions of a church minister was completely controlled 
by the government; the government appointed, placed and dismissed 
ministers and in some cases even disciplined them. Under the rule of 
Lord Charles Somerset it was a deliberate goal of the government to 
anglicise the Dutch Reformed Church – for this purpose it used the 
Scots ministers (Van der Watt 1976:70–71). 
 In 1843 the Church Ordinance of De Mist was replaced by 
Ordinance 7 of 1843. This Ordinance ostensibly made the church 
more free from control by the government, such as that Political 
Commissioners no longer took a seat in church meetings, and the 
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 church received the power to regulate its own internal affairs. The 
Ordinance was presented under the heading of “The Separation of 
Church and State Petition”. Yet in practice the church remained 
subject to government in so far as the government controlled the 
church through the power of the purse and the privilege of 
presenting ministers to congregations. Furthermore, the Ordinance 
restricted the church with regard to its faith character, its 
organisation, its competence and its geographical limits (Kleynhans 
1973:80-84). It was generally accepted that Ordinance 7 of 1843 
severely restricted the freedom of the church (Van der Watt 1980:44-
46).  
 The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa (the Cape 
Province) eventually decided on 21 October 1957 to ask the 
Government to revoke Ordinance 7 of 1843. 
The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa declares 
and confirms its historical view that this Church as an 
organized body had an independent existence in own 
competence even though always subjected to the articles 
of law applicable to the church. Since the existence of the 
church is not dependent on the articles of law, Synod, 
given the legal advice which was obtained, mandates the 
Moderature to approach the authorities to revoke 
Ordinance 7 of 1843. 
(Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika 
verklaar en bevestig hiermee sy volgehoue historiese 
standpunt dat hierdie Kerk, as georganiseerde liggaam, 
steeds in eie kring ‘n selfstandige bestaan gevoer het, 
hoewel noodwendig onderhewig aan wetteregtelike 
bepalings wat van owerheidsweë van tyd tot tyd op die 
Kerk van toepassing verklaar is. Aangesien die bestaan 
van die Kerk dan nie van sodanige wetteregtelike 
bepalings afhanklik is of daarop gevestig is nie, besluit 
die Sinode hiermee dat dit aan die Moderatuur opgedra 
word om in die reses, ooreenkomstig regsadvies, die 
aangewese owerheidsinstansie te beweeg om die ter sake 
wetteregtelike bepalings, naamlik Ordonnansie 7 van 
1843 en latere wetgewing wat dit wysig, te herroep) 
(Kleynhans 1973:95). 
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 In 1948 the Nationalist Party came into power and very soon started 
to enforce its policy of apartheid on the whole of the country, 
including the churches. It cannot be said that there was no tolerance 
of different faith convictions in the country, but all along the 
government was controlling the churches through its policies. In 
many cases Afrikaans speaking churches not only subscribed to the 
policies of the government but also encouraged them. Examples of 
this include the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 
which prohibited marriages between couples from different race 
groups; the Immorality Amendment Act 21 of 1950; Sexual Offences 
Act 23 of 1957; the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957; and the Native 
Laws Amendment Act 36 of 1957 with the so-called church section 
(section 29(c)). According to this section, non-whites could be 
prohibited from attending church services in white areas. Later it 
was explained that the intention was not to prohibit bona fide church 
meetings as long as these meetings were not used to disturb the 
public order (Van der Watt 1987:84-86). The fact remains that 
religion and elements of the freedom of religion were controlled by 
the policies of the government. 
 In December 1960 the Cottesloe deliberation took place 
between delegates from different churches in South Africa as well as 
members of the World Council of Churches. The Dutch Reformed 
Church was part of the deliberation. At the end of the deliberation a 
statement was issued with decisions, which were seen as very 
contentious by some. The most contentious of these regarded the 
following: (1) All race groups in South Africa were seen as living 
permanently in the country, sharing in all privileges and 
responsibilities. (2) The natural diversity among people is not 
eradicated by the unity of the body of Christ − yet the unity must 
also be expressed. This meant that nobody could be excluded from a 
church on the grounds of race or colour. (3) There are no scriptural 
grounds for prohibiting mixed marriages. (4) It is the responsibility 
of the authorities to look after matters such as insufficient salaries, 
job reservation, the negative effects of migratory labour on families; 
the planning of urban areas for people of colour in which ownership 
was taken into account; and the poor standard of communication 
between the different race groups and their leaders in the country. 
 After the delegates of the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa 
issued a statement in which they rejected any form of integration in 
South Africa, the delegates of the Dutch Reformed Church also 
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 issued a statement in which they confirmed that the policy of 
differentiation was the only realistic solution for the problems of the 
country. However, they also stated that it was the task of the church 
to be the conscience of the government − in other words, it was the 
task of the church to test the whole of reality against the principles of 
Scripture. 
 The fact that the deliberation made some negative sounds 
towards the policy of the government caused reaction − some 
positive, some negative. The then Prime Minister, H F Verwoerd, 
reacted very negatively in his annual New Year radio address, stating 
that the decisions were not the official viewpoint of the Dutch 
Reformed Church. The official viewpoint would be put by the 
synods. In the press and in different congregations of the DRC there 
was heated reaction by members of the church. In 1961 the Federal 
Council of Dutch Reformed Churches, the Synodical Commission of 
the Orange Free State, as well as the synod meetings of Natal, South 
West Africa, the Transvaal and the Cape all rejected the Cottesloe 
decisions (Van der Watt 1987:105-112).  
 Although the DRC delegates to Cottesloe made it clear that 
they saw it as the task of the church to be the conscience of the 
government and to measure the whole of life against the principles 
of Scripture, the fact remains that the church in its major assemblies 
made a U-turn when it became clear that the Cottesloe decisions 
criticised the policy of the government. Once again the government 
succeeded in controlling the church − once again a Constantinian 
relationship between church and state prevailed. 
 Contrary to the argument of Kuperus that the DRC did not 
develop in its view on the relationship between church and state, and 
that it actually only deferred to its conservative members while the 
state continued with its reform efforts after 1979, this article argues 
that after Cottesloe there was serious reflection within the DRC on 
various matters regarding its relationship to the state. The argument 
is substantiated by the fact that the General Synod of the DRC came 
into being in October 1962. The church developed in its view on 
freedom of religion. In this regard it is very interesting to compare 
the formulation on freedom of religion in the first Church Order of 
the General Synod in 1962, where it was said: “The Church accepts 
with gratefulness the protection by the authorities as well as the 
recognition of its undeniable right to freedom of religion in 
confession and assembly with the proviso that these freedoms will 
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 not be misused to undermine the foundations of state authority or to 
cause chaos in the public sphere” (Church Order 1962: art 65 c) and 
the formulation in Church and Society of 1990, paragraph 301: “The 
principle of religious freedom must be maintained at all times. This 
means that the government must be impartial to all churches and 
religions, that scope must be given in which the church may 
continue with its work without government interference and that no 
one will be discriminated against on account of their religious 
convictions” (Church and Society 1990:par 301). It is also 
significant how the DRC grew in its view on the relationship 
between church and state. In 1962 the Church Order reads: “The 
Church accepts with gratefulness the protection by the authorities” 
(Church Order 1962, art 65). In the same art 65 (Church Order 
1962), the church claims that it is independent in its own 
competency, which means that the church has an inalienable right to 
freedom of religion in terms of its confession of faith and right of 
association. It also claims that it is the church's sacred calling to 
address the state and the world in a prophetic manner according to 
the gospel. The Church Order also makes no pronouncement on the 
state's duty towards the church as it appears in article 36 of the 
Belgic Confession of Faith. The article does declare that the church 
is subject to the laws of the country in as far as they are not in 
conflict with the word of God (see also Strauss 2003:253). In 1990 
we read the following in paragraph 290 of Church and Society: 
It is the task and calling of the government, as servant of 
God, to ensure peace, rest and justice, and to care for the 
welfare of all its subjects. The government is the only 
body which received the right from God to use the power 
of the sword in the pursuit of its calling. This implies 
inter alia that the government will create a climate in 
which it is possible for the true church of Christ to 
withstand all idolatry and false worship, by means of the 
proclamation of the Word of God, to oppose the kingdom 
of the antichrist and to promote the kingdom of Christ  
(Church and Society 1990:par 290). 
Also, between 1960 and 1994 serious discussions took place within 
the church on the formulation of article 36 of the Dutch Confession 
of Faith: discussions which led to a reformulation to the effect that it 
was not the task of the state to promote the church, but that the state 
had to create favourable conditions in which the church could fulfil 
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 its calling and task (Church and Society 1990:290). It is also very 
significant that in 1986 the DRC officially declared: 
Belief in the Triune God, his revelation in Scripture and 
the expression of this in the accepted articles of Faith, is 
the only condition for belonging to the church of Jesus 
Christ; therefore this belief is the basic condition for 
becoming a member of a Dutch Reformed Church 
(Church and Society 1986:par 265). 
In 1990 the following was decided: 
Belief in the God of Holy Scripture as expressed in the 
three Formularies of Unity is the only condition for 
belonging to a Dutch Reformed congregation as 
congregation of the Lord Jesus Christ. Membership of all 
Dutch Reformed congregations are open to any believer 
who accepts the confession of the church (Church and 
Society 1990:par 251 & 252). 
In those years serious reflection also took place in theological 
forums on the nature of the church and the kingdom of God. Much 
of this was formulated in the various editions of Church and society 
as well as in the writings of DRC theologians. The DRC realised that 
as a church it was not and could not be the handmaiden of the state, 
it had its own specific task and calling to fulfil. This realisation 
continues under the new Constitution, which guarantees freedom of 
religion for churches and religions in South Africa. In this regard it is 
very significant to note that already in 1986, long before 1991, the 
General Synod of the DRC declared that forced separation and 
division of peoples could not be considered a biblical imperative: 
“The attempt to justify such an injunction as derived from the Bible 
must be recognised as an error and be rejected” (Church and Society 
1986:par 305). In 1990 the following wording was used: 
While the Dutch Reformed Church over the years 
seriously and persistently sought the will of God and his 
Word for our society, the church made the error of 
allowing forced separation and division of peoples in its 
own circle, to be considered a biblical imperative. The 
Dutch Reformed Church should have distanced itself 
much earlier from this view and admits and confesses its 
neglect (Church and Society 1990:par. 283). 
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 In conclusion to this part of the article it can be said that from 1652 
until 1994 it was a predominantly Constantinian model of the 
relationship between church and state that to a greater or lesser 
degree controlled the relationship between church and state in South 
Africa. This meant that the church was subjected, nearly always with 
its own consent, to control by the authorities. From 1948 it can be 
said that the control by government was largely inspired by the 
political policies of the National Party. During these times one 
cannot speak of freedom of religion for churches and religions in 
South Africa − it was much rather a case of denominations and 
religions being tolerated. But it was also a toleration that went just as 
far as the policy of the government in power. Many examples from 
history, especially after 1781, right up until 1994 can be called as 
witness to this fact. At the same time it must be admitted that from 
1961 onwards serious thinking on the relationship between church 
and state took place within the Dutch Reformed Church, although to 
a large extent a Constantinian relationship between church and state 
continued to exist up until 1994.  
 After 1994 with the new Constitution a new era with regard to 
freedom of religion came into existence in South Africa. Freedom of 
religion became a constitutionally guaranteed right. The question is 
what that means and how freedom of religion should be understood 
and managed in the new South Africa. This will be addressed in the 
next part of the article. 
3 PART 2: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
AFTER 1994 
3.1 The new Constitution 
In 1994 a new Constitution was accepted (it was finalised in 1996) 
and for the first time in the history of South Africa freedom of 
religion was guaranteed.  
 Under the current Constitution: 
3.1.1 The South African State can be defined as a Constitutional 
State which means that the State makes use of a written Constitution 
and a Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) to obtain unity 
among the diversity of legal groups and legal interests in the country. 
3.1.2 The Constitution is the highest authority in the country 
(Constitution a.2). 
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 3.1.3 The Constitution distinguishes between organs of the State 
(a.239) and organs of civil society [a.31(1)(b)]. 
3.1.4 According to the Constitution, persons from a certain language, 
cultural and religious group cannot be prohibited to enjoy, together 
with other members of their group, their culture, use their language 
and practice their religion [a.31(1) (a)]. 
3.1.5 The Constitution also provides for the possibility that the 
citizens of South Africa may form cultural, language and religious 
associations or other organs of civil society, maintain such 
associations and also join such associations [31(1) (b)]. 
3.1.6 The Constitution also guarantees the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thoughts, conviction and opinion [a15 (1)]. 
Under certain conditions religion may also be practiced at certain 
state or state aided institutions [a 15 (2)] while marriages may inter 
alia be conducted according to a religious system as long as it can 
exist in accordance with other sections of the Constitution [15 (3) (a) 
(i) and (b)]. 
3.1.7 The Bill of Rights in the Constitution is prescriptive for the 
State and organs of the State [a.8(1)] as well as for natural and legal 
persons, such as churches and religious communities [a.8(2)]. 
3.1.8 Section 36 of the Constitution makes it possible for the State as 
well as for organs of civil society to limit certain rights of the Bill of 
Rights [a.36].  
• The State can limit rights either by way of an internal 
limitation section within a section [9(2), 15 (2) (a), 25 (2) 
and 29 (2)] or by means of an external law which is 
acceptable within the context of a just democratic 
society. 
• Institutions of civil society can use the limitations clause 
[section.36] of the Constitution to limit certain sections 
of the Bill of Rights in their own internal constitutions 
and regulations, given the provisions and conditions 
made for such a limitation in section 36 (Landman 
2006:6-8). 
• Section 234 of the South African Constitution allows for 
charters of rights: “In order to deepen the culture of 
democracy established by the Constitution, Parliament 
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 may adopt Charters of Rights consistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution.” 
3.2 Religious pluralism in South Africa 
Statistics show that there is a majority religion in South Africa − the 
Christian religion. However, within the Christian religion there is no 
majority denomination − they are all minority denominations. At the 
same time none of the other religions in South Africa can claim to be 
a majority religion − quite the contrary! With regard to religions and 
religious denominations there are no majorities in South Africa − 
they are all minorities (South African Christian handbook 2005-
2006:28-34). 
 South Africa like many other countries in the world not only 
has a wide variety of Christian denominations but also a variety of 
religions that all exist within the boundaries of one state. There is 
indeed a plurality (multiplicity, diversity) of complementary, 
overlapping and mutually dependent institutions and associations 
which make up the social face of South Africa. One can say all of 
this is rooted in God’s creation and forms part of the Kingdom of 
God. They are all called to live coram Deo and are called to respond 
to the calling of God's rule over them. All these institutions, 
directions and contexts will in the end be responsible to God for the 
way in which they discern their task and do their work. 
The principle of complementary responsibilities suggests 
that faithful living in each area of society must be 
determined by discerning, in the light of the Bible and 
creation, the nature and calling of each social area. This 
breaks with the classic liberal idea that autonomous 
individuals determine how institutions should function in 
society, including the state. Classic liberals want to limit 
the state with external constraint of “consent”, later 
understood as popular sovereignty functioning through 
the majority mechanism. The principle of complementary 
responsibilities limits societal institutions and the state in 
two ways: by calling them to be faithful to their God-
given calling and by asking them to respect and serve 
other societal institutions which each have their own 
calling (Hiemstra 2005:21). 
The fact that the plurality of institutions and associations are 
mutually interdependent means that no institution or association is 
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 autonomous − a law unto itself; they all exist, or should exist, to 
enable humanity to achieve its true unifying purpose, namely to love 
God and neighbour (Hiemstra 2005:22–23). 
 Apart from the plurality of institutions and associations in the 
Kingdom of God, a plurality of directions is also a reality that has to 
be reckoned with. “The full reality of institutional plurality in society 
can be unfolded in many religious and ideological directions” 
(Hiemstra 2005:46). The fact that many of the ideological and 
religious directions of institutions and associations in society cannot 
be accepted by Christians does not mean that they should not be 
respected and tolerated. Disagreement does not make them less real 
or diminish the calling of both church and state to deal with the 
plurality of directions in society − each of course in its own way. 
“The state must respect and tolerate the convictions and conscience 
of its neighbours in a plurality of institutions within society while 
vigilantly executing its limited task of public justice” (Hiemstra 
2005:47). The church must also respect the convictions of its 
neighbours in a society with a plurality of other directional 
individuals, institutions and associations. This does not mean that the 
church and Christians must approve of all the different directions in 
society; it does mean that the church and Christians cannot deny 
their existence. The church must also never forget that it has the 
undeniable task of proclaiming through word and deed the gospel of 
the Kingdom of God, calling all people, institutions and associations 
of whatever direction they may be to obedience to the Triune God.  
 All of this not only poses questions to government as to how it 
should cope with such a variety of religions: it is also a question of 
how these denominations and religions can co-exist and at the same 
time all enjoy religious freedom, feel safe and not be threatened.  
3.3 Freedom of Christian people and guaranteed freedom of 
religion  
A clear distinction must be made between the freedom of religion 
that every human being possess as a quality of life and freedom of 
religion as something guaranteed by the constitution of a country. 
Although there are examples in history of efforts by governments to 
give citizens a certain amount of freedom to practise their religion, 
like the Edict of Milan (315), the Magna Charta (1214), the Edict of 
Turda (1568) and the Edict of Nantes (1598); it was really only after 
the Second World War that international charters of rights were 
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 accepted to protect freedom of religion. In this regard there are art 18 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948); 
art 18 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights 
(16 December 1966) (Malherbe 2007: Motivation art 6; Lerner 
1996:86, 91); art 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome 1950/1953) 
(Malherbe 2007: Motivation art 6; Gunn 1996:305). Furthermore 
there is also the African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights and 
the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) and the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) (Malherbe 2007: 
Motivation art 6). 
 For Christians the deepest foundation for freedom is that God 
created man in His image with the capability to choose to serve God. 
Man lost this freedom when he chose to follow the way of evil 
instead of the way of God. In Jesus Christ the freedom of those who 
believe in Him was restored. This is a freedom that is not dependent 
on any constitutional guarantee. This is one reason why Christianity 
was able to endure through many centuries and many regimes 
without having a constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of 
religion. Where there is a constitutional guarantee for freedom of 
religion, it enhances the freedom that Christians have in Christ and 
offers Christians the opportunity to publicly proclaim their faith 
identity in Christ without any fear of prosecution or discrimination.  
3.4 Freedom of religion as a constitutional right  
It is difficult to put freedom of religion as a constitutional right into a 
simple definition. It is much more a concept that needs to be 
circumscribed. It is also a concept that can continue to develop in 
future. The Constitution describes freedom of religion in rather 
vague terms merely as “… the right to freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion” [Constitution section 15 (1)]. It 
further states that “… religious observances may be conducted at 
state or state aided institutions”, provided that these comply with 
certain conditions [Constitution section 15 (2)]. Section 15 (3) 
provides for “… marriages conducted under any tradition, or a 
system of religious, personal or family law”. Primarily it is and 
remains the task of the religions and religious people of South Africa 
to identify those rights in a way consistent with their own religious 
identity and within the ambit that the Constitution and the laws of 
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 the country allow. If the religions and religious people of South 
Africa do not accept this task it will be taken over by government, 
the courts of the country and society and it will be fulfilled in a way 
which will not necessarily further freedom of religion: a way that 
could once again promote Constantinianism. In fulfilling their task, 
churches and religions must be make very sure of their deepest roots 
and identity and also make sure of the rights and obligations that 
spring from those roots and identity. They must also take note of the 
Charter of Human Rights contained in the second chapter of the 
Constitution, as well as of the Acts of parliament which further 
describe the content and application of the rights concerned.  
 The following examples of such acts may be mentioned: 
● Section 9 (the right to equality): the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 
Act 4 of 2000; 
● Section 23 (labour rights): the Labour Relations Act, Act 
66 of 1995; 
● Section 32 (the right to access to information): the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act, Act 2 of 2000; 
● Section 33 (the right to administrative justice): the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, Act 3 of 2000. 
Directly or indirectly, numerous other acts give effect to the rights in 
the Constitution as well, as in the case of health, housing, education, 
the environment, the rights of children, the right to vote, and the 
rights of accused persons and prisoners (Malherbe 2007: Motivation 
art 4). Religions need to position themselves with regard to the rights 
in the Constitution and acts that describe the content and application 
of those rights in a responsible manner in order to determine whether 
they can subscribe to them as a religion, or to acquaint themselves 
with the grounds on which they may want to limit those rights in 
their organisation. 
3.5 A charter of religious rights for South Africa 
Currently a Charter of Religious Rights for South Africa is being 
developed. It was put as a proposal to a workshop of churches and 
religions held in Stellenbosch on Thursday, 14 February 2007. After 
it was circulated very widely amongst churches and religious 
communities for their comments a few amendments were made on 
29 May 2008. In the latest amended version of the Proposed Charter 
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 for Religious Rights and Freedoms the following rights and 
obligations are identified – the rights and obligations are merely 
mentioned without going into all the subdivisions. The references are 
to the articles in the proposed amended Charter of religious rights 
and freedoms for South Africa.  
● The right to believe or not to believe (art 1-2.4); 
● The obligations of the state with regard to religious rights 
(art 3-3.2, art 9.3); 
● The right to observe and exercise one’s religion (art 4-
4.5); 
● The right to education consistent with ones religious 
convictions (art 7 and 8); 
● The right to maintain particular matrimonial, family and 
personal legal traditions (art 5); 
● The right to institutional freedom (art 9); 
● The rights and obligations of religion with regard to the 
laws of the land (art 9.4, 10); 
● The right of religion to freedom of expression (art 6-6.3); 
● The right of religion to freedom of association (art 1-
2.2); 
● The right of religion to freedom of propagation (art 6.2); 
● The right to religious dignity (art 6.3); 
● The right of religion to solicit, receive, manage and 
spend voluntary financial and other forms of support and 
contributions art 11); 
● The right of religion to conduct upliftment and charity 
work in the community and to establish maintain and 
contribute to charity and welfare associations, and solicit, 
manage, distribute and spend funds for this purpose (art 
12). 
All of the above in fact describes what freedom of religion is. It can 
also be said in the words of John Witte (2003:37) that freedom of 
religion is 
(i) freedom of conscience; 
(ii) the free exercise of religion; 
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 (iii) religious pluralism; 
(iv) religious equality; 
(v) the separation of church and state; and 
(vi) the disestablishment of religion by the state.  
4 CONCLUSION 
Between 1652 and 1994 religion in South Africa, in line with the 
Constantinian model for the relation between church and state, was 
controlled either by the governing authority, the government or the 
policy of the ruling party. In the strict sense of the word there was no 
freedom of religion. Christian churches and other religions were 
tolerated and were subjected to the control of the government.  
 In 1994 (1996) South Africa got a Constitution which 
guaranteed freedom of religion. The Constitution does not clearly 
identify in detail what freedom of religion implies. It is the task of 
religions in South Africa to identify the religious rights that they 
claim. If they do not do this, the state will do it for them by way of 
either legislation or the decisions of the courts of the country − and 
this will not further the cause of religious freedom, but rather 
relegate South Africa to a Constantinian model of the relationship 
between church and State − a situation where the state controls 
religion. 
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